The present contribution aims to analyse the political-economic outcome occasioned by Chad’s repositioning as a military agent in the Sahel. Military engagements in Mali in 2013 and in coalition against Boko Haram from 2015 have contributed to define an image of strength and stability for a political regime whose internal legitimacy is gradually being eroded. Such a contradiction can be understood by observing president Déby’s management of the regime’s internal tensions combined with the oil-driven massive boost of the military apparatus. These policies have nonetheless exacerbated conflicts between clients, weakening the regime’s legitimacy especially among the influencing category of de-mobilised former combatants, that are now largely employed in profitable capital-extraction positions at frontier posts. By focusing on such developments, this paper non-exhaustively discusses the reshaping of a regime’s internal viability through military-diplomatic efforts, contributing to fill the knowledge gap on the political significance and cost-effectiveness of the Western-sponsored War on Terror in the Sahel.