The Persian Gulf has acquired increased importance in China’s global projection in the last two decades. While the region was historically associated with Beijing’s energy security strategy, the launch of the BRI in 2013 has recentred the dominant narrative underlying this encounter around China’s multifaced grand project. By separately looking at Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, which are characterised by antithetic relationships with Washington but similar attitudes towards Beijing, the paper will explore if and how the BRI has turned into a driver of great powers competition between China and the United States in the Persian Gulf. The paper concludes that the BRI is not a driver of great power competition per se, and it has been an element of substantial continuity rather than disruption in the historical trajectory of Sino-Persian Gulf relations. Ultimately, the paper suggests that the primary sources of competition between Washington and Beijing in the Persian Gulf are three: (1) a natural spillover of the global competition between the two great powers; (2) the China-US-Iran triangle; and (3) China’s occasional intrusion in susceptible areas of cooperation with the Arab Gulf Kingdoms.