

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.23810/1345.VENTURI>

When citing this article please include its DOI with a resolving link

The African Union at a Glance: Is a Regional Game Changer Emerging?

Bernardo Venturi

123

Introduction

The establishment of the African Union (AU) and its architecture has been a leap forward for Africa's integration, prosperity and peaceful future. The foundation of the AU moved from Pan-African roots (Mezu 1965; Murithi 2005) and has been able to transform them into concrete political and operational terms. However, the transformative process has just started and the AU will need several reforms and continuous improvements to achieve the ambitious objectives presented in its programmatic *Agenda 2063*. The AU has developed several strategic documents, but it remains a highly hierarchic and bureaucratic organization, still inefficient in several daily practices. For instance, organizing an event or a meeting is a complex task since Africans, foreigners and civil society organizations have few chances to dialogue and contribute within the AU framework. In the last decade, African capabilities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts have grown substantially and the AU has played a pivotal role in this process. However, in order to become a regional game changer, the AU's institutional architecture needs practical reforms and the peace sector should be prioritized. In this framework, the European Union (EU) is the AU's main international partner and donor, especially

on peace and security. This partnership has strengthened the AU's capabilities and this trend could continue in the future.

Firstly, this article will present the political and institutional evolution of the AU and its main current challenges. Then, it will focus on peace and security as a key sector in which the AU could become a game changer. In this area, to act as a game changer could mean to have a significant long-term impact on conflict prevention and play a key role in regional peace processes. Finally, the partnership with the EU will be discussed as a strategic alliance for strengthening peace and security capabilities.

The AU's political and institutional evolution

The African Union was not designed as a club, but as an inclusive Pan-African organization established to play a unique role in the continent.¹ In fact, the building of the AU is rooted in the Pan-African movement and its demand for greater solidarity among the peoples of Africa (Mezu 1965).² The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 by the 32 African countries that had achieved independence at the time. A further 21 members joined progressively, reaching a total of 53 by the time of the AU's foundation in 2002. In 2011, South Sudan became the 54th Member State. Morocco left the OAU in 1984 after the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) was fully recognized by the organization in 1982. Morocco, due to the strategic importance of the organization, re-joined the African Union in 2017. The OAU operated with objectives spanning from promoting the unity and solidarity of African states to coordinating and intensifying their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa, safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, and releasing the continent from colonization and apartheid. Through the 1990s, African leaders debated the need to amend the OAU's structures to reflect the challenges of a changing continent. A focus on colonialism, for instance, had become obsolete and the emerging needs were related to Africa's development and integration. Additionally, the OAU had failed to live up to its norms and principles in terms of promoting a more prosperous and peaceful continent.³ The creation of the AU paved the way to multi-layered objectives such as supporting the empowerment of African states in the global economy, addressing the multifaceted social, economic and political problems facing the continent, and promoting peace, security, stability, democracy, good governance and human rights.⁴

There was continuity between the two organizations (both based in Addis Ababa) in terms of treaties and conventions, but the new organization also established a significant number of new institutional bodies and structures. As a pivotal step, in January 2016, AU Assembly decisions included that of revising and reviewing the AU Constitutive Act "for it to be an effective legal instrument to accelerate, facilitate and deepen the efficiency and the integration process on the continent" (African Union 2016b: 22). Another important reform in terms of geographical representation was characterized

by the Executive Council decisions that all AU organs shall, where applicable, have two representatives from each of the five African regions⁵ and one floating seat rotating among the regions, and that at least one member of each region shall be a woman (African Union 2016a).

The AU structure is also grounded on eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs),⁶ all pre-existing to the creation of the AU. The purpose of the RECs is mainly to facilitate regional economic integration between members of the individual regions and to seek to establish an African Common Market using the RECs as building blocks.⁷ However, some RECs (e.g. ECOWAS) have also played an important role in the peace and security domain and the AU has been working to improve this dimension at the RECs level.

The AU's vision could be deeper investigated analysing the *Agenda 2063*, the 50-year programme officially adopted by the AU Assembly in 2015. The *Agenda* was launched for the OAU-AU 50th anniversary commemorations in the spirit of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. The *Agenda* has a vision of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena".⁸ The *Agenda 2063* therefore provides a new collective vision and a roadmap in order to build a prosperous and united Africa based on shared values and a common destiny. The *Agenda* also presents seven significant aspirations that project Africa as a prosperous, peaceful, democratic and integrated continent.⁹ Overall, *Agenda 2063* diverges from past continental documents and initiatives for different reasons. Firstly, the *Agenda* is result-oriented (goals, targets and strategies have been set in each aspirational area). Secondly, monitoring/evaluation and accountability are included. The *Agenda* is also a consistent effort to bring all continental and regional initiatives under the same umbrella for the first time.¹⁰

Two issues targeted in the *Agenda* remain significant challenges for the AU. Firstly, financially the AU would like to achieve economic independence. However, while among its objectives the *Agenda 2063* presents the "principle of self-reliance and Africa financing its development",¹¹ a large part of its budget is still supported by international donors and almost 90% of the peace and security bill of the AU is currently footed by external partners. The reliance on external financing sources has created considerable tensions both within the AU and between the AU and its external partners.¹² In 2016 the African governments decided to implement a 0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the AU. This decision represents a relevant basis for relaunching the financial strategy of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is expected that the 0.2% levy will endow the Peace Fund with \$400 million by 2020, but at the end of 2017, only Ghana and Rwanda have enacted the levy into national law. Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Republic of Congo are the only other states known to have taken steps to implement it.¹³ Significantly, the World Trade Organisation and the United States are questioning the legality of the implementation of the new self-financing mechanism.¹⁴ The independence and self-reliance of the AU therefore remain an existential question

for Africa, as pointed out by the Rwandan President, Paul Kagame.¹⁵

A second challenge is related to capacity building. A key factor for the successful implementation of *Agenda 2063* is the capacity of individuals and institutions to play their roles in the domestication of the *Agenda*. To this purpose, a significant step was done in 2016 with the establishment of the African Union Leadership Academy (AULA) within the AU structure. AULA has the objective of improving knowledge, skills and mindsets needed to achieve the goals presented in the *Agenda 2063* as well as becoming a centre of excellence in the area of public sector administration. AULA therefore supports public servants and middle managers from the AU, RECs and Member States. The Academy also aims to train emerging young African leaders who will form the future elite of the AU, Member States and related organizations. During its first year, AULA undertook various activities within its different categories of programs: three trainings, five knowledge-sharing, and four policy-program dialogues. In addition to that, a debate with the candidates for the position of the AU Chairperson and two seminars were held. It will be possible to evaluate this significant effort in the coming years. AULA supports AU's potential future leaders, and leadership definitely plays a crucial role. Moussa Faki, for instance, the current Chairperson of the African Union Commission, has been establishing constructive international relations, while his predecessor, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (October 2012 to March 2017), often pushed tensions over anti-colonial rhetoric, an attitude with a detrimental effect on trust and confidence.¹⁶ The current institutional architecture, vision and objectives of the AU have the potential to transform the organization in a continental game changer able to lead on different domains, from economics to peace and security. However, the AU is still inefficient and its power will be measured by its ability to deliver concrete results. The current main operational challenge for Moussa Faki and for the whole AU is to improve peace and security in Africa.

A peace and security provider

Peace, security and conflict prevention are at the bulk of the AU's mission and represent the most demanding and most expensive part of its budget and agenda. Significantly, never have more African troops been deployed in Africa, both as AU peace operations and as part of the United Nations (UN) operations.¹⁷ Additionally, the AU represents a key actor in peace processes in Africa: between 2013 and 2015 the AU and RECs were involved in around 73% of peace processes where peace agreements were signed.¹⁸ This is a real architecture for peace that for the first time has African actors as protagonists and projects the AU as a game changer in the region. At the same time, terrorist threats and attacks in Nigeria and Somalia, the violent conflicts in South Sudan and in the Central African Republic, and the lack of stability in several other regions have triggered growing disillusionment about the AU's capacities to build and sustain peace (Makinda, Wafula Okumu, Mickler 2015: 97-99). Furthermore, terrorism and the *war on*

terror have also been used by the African states and external powers to take advantage of security problems (*ibid.*: 105).

APSA is the umbrella term for the key AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in the African continent. Recently established during the transformation from the OAU to the AU, APSA gathers all the different programmes and institutional bodies dealing with peace and security-related issues. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) – the AU's sole standing decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts – is the main pillar of the APSA. The APSA embraces a comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa that includes early warning and conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations, peacebuilding, good governance and respect for human rights, and humanitarian action.¹⁹

In the 1990s, the domain of peace and security continued to be considered exclusive domestic jurisdiction of Member States, and the OAU was not influential in this context. Instead, the AU shifted its legal framework and political weight in that direction. An innovative principle was adopted in the Constitutive Act, giving the AU the right "to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".²⁰ This legal support could provide a crucial tool to the AU. However, these circumstances are considered extreme cases and the respect for national sovereignty has been firmly upheld in the AU's Constitutive Act. Decisions of AU Member States on how they position themselves on a violent conflict are still heavily informed by national and regional political issues. This is true both at the level of the AU as well as at the level of REC/RMs.²¹ Overall, Member States seem to reject the involvement by AU/RECs in cases of severe security challenges quoting the principles of territorial integrity, sovereign status, and non-interference.²² Additionally Member States are not the only actors working with the AU. In fact, the relationship between the AU, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa, and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) is a key APSA component. RECs developed individually before the establishment of the AU and they have different mandates and mechanisms, including for peace and security. The APSA is built upon the five African regions considered by the AU. Complexity arises because the AU recognises eight RECs and two Regional Mechanisms (RMs), and the membership of REC/RMs and the five regions of the APSA overlap.

Globally, there is no other continental framework that provides regional institutions with a comparable mandate and such extensive instruments for conflict transformation.²³ However, this architecture, combined with a lack of legal clarity, generates limits and problems to coordination, leadership and responses in case of conflict and crisis. The current infrastructure shows a strong legal framework that legitimizes the thesis of the AU as a regional game changer combined with a weak policy-making and internal

governance. This combination also shows the actual long road ahead to achieve this result. For instance, the African Standby Force (ASF) is composed of five regional standby brigades. As a consequence, two coordinating mechanisms were established to manage the regional standby brigade of the ASF in East and North Africa, namely the East African Standby Force (EASF) and Secretariat and the North African Regional Capability (NARC). The regional standby brigades for West, Central, and Southern Africa are managed and hosted by ECOWAS, ECCAS and SADC respectively.²⁴ Despite these difficulties, the AU and REC/RMs have gradually increased their joint efforts when intervening in violent conflicts. Reasonably, a significant level of alignment between the AU and RECs and its international partners contributed to a higher level of intensity and quality of engagement in a specific conflict.²⁵ Furthermore, as regards to mediation and preventive diplomacy, the AU and REC/RMs have increasingly intervened through a combination of instruments and they have established an International Contact Group (ICG) to coordinate efforts and issue joint political statements, including with international partners.²⁶

The AU has also shown capacities to intervene through its missions in conflict areas. The first military intervention in a Member State was the deployment in May 2003 of a peacekeeping force of soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi to oversee the implementation of the various agreements. Eight AU's Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have been deployed since 2003. The ASF policy framework provides for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), under the Africa Union Commission (AUC) Department of Peace and Security, to be responsible for the execution of all PSC decisions about the deployment of PSOs.²⁷ The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) could be considered as the largest military effort of the AU. The mission was established by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007 to support the transitional federal institutions in their efforts towards dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, as well as to facilitate humanitarian assistance and create conditions conducive to long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development. Contrary to the UN, AU's troops are recruited by a few countries; for instance, in AMISOM seven African countries contribute to the deployment (Williams 2014). A wider continental support could represent a significant improvement for the future both in terms of political and military strength.

In general, the capacity and political will of AU and RECs to intervene in violent conflicts over the continent have increased over the past years.²⁸ In 2016, the AU and RECs intervened in 28 conflicts through diplomacy, mediation, peace support operations or a combination of all three instruments. Remarkably, 75% of these interventions were deemed to be successful or partially successful in either preventing or de-escalating conflict.²⁹ Since 2016, the AU and RECs also showed that they are willing and able to be adaptive, innovative and decisive in the use of APSA instruments, for instance in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Other conflicts, however, such as those in Sudan, South

Sudan and Somalia, have a long history of interventions by AU/RECs without much progress or strategic breakthrough.³⁰

Peace and security are therefore operationalized fields for the AU, but significant improvements are needed in order to become sustainable and effective. As highlighted by the Kagame Report on AU Institutional Reforms and the January 2017 Reform Decisions of the AU Summit, there are on-going attempts at structural reforms to streamline the AU in terms of core competencies, priority areas, realignment of institutions and improvement of its accountability.³¹ According to Paul Kagame's Report,³² APSA is included as a milestone for the AU's ambitions to secure peace and reconciliation. In fact, Kagame's reform agenda would reduce the AU's focus to just four areas with continental scope,³³ highlighting AU's role on peace and security as a priority. This direction appears appropriate in order to prioritize on areas in which the AU can be a game changer. The African Union has already clearly drafted the APSA's roadmap for the near future defining priorities and indicators.³⁴ Now it is time also for the international partners, *in primis* the EU, to develop their joint strategies based on African guidelines.

The AU-EU partnership for peace and security

The EU is the AU's main international partner and donor. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 represents the main framework of this cooperation.³⁵ Africa-EU relations were for a long time mainly based on the economic and development dimension, but the issues of conflict prevention and security have gained importance since the early/mid-1990s.³⁶ The JAES was designed to address issues of common concern³⁷ and "jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism", mentioning in particular "the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and other key international institutions".³⁸ Lastly, it sought to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership, acknowledging that "the Joint Strategy should be co-owned by European and African non-institutional actors" willing to make it a "permanent platform for information, participation, and mobilization of a broad spectrum of civil society actors".³⁹ The Joint Africa-EU Strategy aims, in principle, "to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts".⁴⁰ Unity of intents between Africa and the EU is emphasized as the way "to address issues of common concern in the global arena".⁴¹ In this framework, the EU is determined to support African self-determination discourse based on local capabilities, for instance through the funding provided to the AU and in particular to the APSA.

In the APSA framework, the main EU financial instrument to support cooperation with Africa in the area of peace and security is the African Peace Facility (APF). Established

at the request of African leaders at the AU Maputo Summit in 2003, it has three components: African Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the operationalization of the APSA and initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism. The bulk of the APF funding was allocated to PSOs. EU efforts are mainly directed at providing political backing as well as predictable resources to PSOs and capacity-building activities as well as mediation activities at both continental and regional levels. Concretely, since its creation, more than 2.1 billion euros have been allocated to the APF: by the end of 2016, 1.9 billion euros had already been contracted, of which almost 1.8 billion euros had been paid through this instrument. The strategic orientation of the APF is based on a dual approach, which combines short-term funding for crises with longer-term support to institutional capacity-building in peace and security. In recent months, the APF has continued to support the AU and RECs/RMs having a mandate in peace and security.

The last three years were guided by the 2014–2017 Roadmap, focused on priority areas in which cooperation could represent a substantial added value.⁴² Notably, the first priority area for cooperation between the EU and Africa remains peace and security, as in the previous Action Plans, with the strategic objective “to ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security and reducing fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and inclusive growth”.⁴³ However, since the end of 2015, the tendency for securitization of the migration agenda has reinforced the African perception of a one-way dialogue, ultimately aimed at imposing EU conditionality on its counterpart. This situation has also limited the political dialogue.⁴⁴

130

Undeniably, in the peace and security domain, the EU remains a crucial partner for Africa in terms of both financial and technical support, but there are problems related to the complexity and fragmentation of EU funding schemes and the lack of absorption capacity by the AU. Moreover, as previously discussed, the goal of empowering African peace and security structures still struggles with the heavy dependency of the AU on external funding sources.⁴⁵ However, the AU–EU Summit in Abidjan in late November 2017 was dominated by discussions and decisions around migration, while peace and security issues were not considered as a priority.⁴⁶ The final declaration highlighted the intention to “reiterate our commitment to the implementation of the APSA”, but did not show how to implement this effort. A “framework document” was announced in order to provide a joint answer to the new “common security threats”.⁴⁷ This is an appreciable effort, if it will not only be based on EU interest and overwhelmed by concerns related to migration. Overall, the partnership with the EU could significantly contribute to support the AU as a game changer in Africa, especially on peace and security. Nevertheless, the partnership should be more structured around mutual interests and with a long-term vision.

Conclusion

Does the AU represent a game changer for the African continent? This article shows that its legal framework and vision are oriented in that direction. However, challenges remain in many areas and can limit AU's future efforts. These challenges include complex internal governance and procedures, lack of funds, political willingness to prevent and intervene in violent conflicts, and the inclusion of civil society at different levels.⁴⁸ Peace and security could truly represent a priority for the AU for the added value that the organization could bring to this field. The EU could act as a key partner on peace and security, but the partnership should be based on equal relations and mutual interests in the medium and long-term, and should not be dominated by migration towards Europe. These choices and directions could project the AU as a game changer in the whole continent with a significant impact as a peace broker and as a security provider in regional crises.

Bernardo Venturi is Senior Fellow at Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Roma.

NOTES:

1 - African Union, *Agenda 2063*, "United Nations", 2015: http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au_agenda2063.pdf.

2 - T. Murithi, *From Pan-Africanism to the Union of Africa*, "Global Policy Forum", 20 June 2007: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/173/30538.html>.

3 - T. Murithi, *From Pan-Africanism to the Union of Africa*, cit.

4 - Four summits were held in the lead up to the official launch: the Sirte Summit (1999), which adopted the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of the AU; the Lomé Summit (2000), which adopted the AU Constitutive Act; the Lusaka Summit (2001), which drew the roadmap for the implementation of the AU; and, finally, the Durban Summit (2002), which launched the AU and convened its first Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

5 - The five regions are: Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa.

6 - Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

7 - The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) launched in Kigali, Rwanda, in March 2018 is a paramount step in this direction.

8 - African Union, *Agenda 2063*, cit., p. 3.

9 - The seven aspirations are: a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development; an integrated continent politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance; an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; a peaceful and secure Africa; an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics; an Africa, whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.

10 - African Union, *Agenda 2063*, cit.

11 - African Union, *Agenda 2063*, cit.

12 - AU Peace Fund, *Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa*, "African Union Peace and Security", August 2016: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auhr-progress-report-final-020916->

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13 - *Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations*, Africa Report n. 255, "International Crisis Group", 2017: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/255-time-reset-african-union-european-union-relations>.

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16 - *Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations*, cit.

17 - S. Desmidt, V. Hauck, cit.

18 - S. Desmidt, V. Hauck, cit.

19 - *African Union Handbook 2017*, "African Union", 2017: <https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31829-file-african-union-handbook-2017-edited.pdf>.

20 - African Union, *Constitutive Act*, "African Union Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights", 2000, Article 4(h): http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/au-constitutive-act/au_act_2000_eng.pdf.

21 - It should be also noted that the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol provide both some compelling and restraining factors. See S. Desmidt, V. Hauck, cit.

22 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, "Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)", 2017: http://www.ipss-addis.org/resources/publications/apsa_impact_report_2016.php.

23 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, cit.

24 - S. Desmidt, V. Hauck, cit.

25 - S. Desmidt, V. Hauck, cit.

26 - *African Union Handbook 2017*, cit.

27 - *African Union Handbook 2017*, cit.

28 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, cit.

29 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, cit.

30 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, cit.

31 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, cit.

32 - P. Kagame, *Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union*, cit.

33 - The four areas are: peace and security; political affairs; the establishment of a continental free trade area; and Africa's voice and representation in global affairs. See ICG, *Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations*, cit.; P. Kagame, cit.

34 - African Union, *APSA Roadmap 2016-2020*, "African Union Peace and Security", 2015: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf>.

35 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, "The Africa-EU Partnership", 2007: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf.

36 - F. Faria, *Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Role of the European Union*, in EUISS Occasional Papers, n. 51, "European Union Institute for Security Studies", April 2004: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/crisis-management-in-sub-saharan-africa-the-role-of-the-european-union>.

37 - Including "peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialization, and regional and continental integration in Africa", *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit., p. 3.

38 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit., p. 3.

39 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit. p. 3; N. Pirozzi, N. Sartori, B. Venturi, *The Joint Africa-EU Strategy 10 Years After: Critical Assessment and Outlook*, "European Parliament", 2017: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603849/EXPO_STU\(2017\)603849_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603849/EXPO_STU(2017)603849_EN.pdf).

40 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit., point 13.

41 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit., point 13.

42 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit., p. 1.

43 - *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, cit., p. 2.

44 - N. Pirozzi, N. Sartori, B. Venturi, cit.

45 - European Commission, *African Peace Facility Annual Report 2016*, "The Africa-EU Partnership", 2016: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/apf_ar2016_en_v1_web.pdf.

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47 - AU-EU, cit..

48 - *APSA Impact Report 2016*, cit.

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